Why have debates around the Muslim hijab become increasingly acrimonious? Islamophobia has led to the rise of far-right groups, with calls in Europe and the US for banning headscarves and minarets on mosques. In India, sectarian violence continues unabated since 1947, with hate speech becoming progressively overt. The first half of this paper examines why the Muslim hijab has become the lone metaphor for debates about identity formation, to the exclusion of veiling prevalent in other religious and cultural contexts. How (...) would Muslim migrant writers find these debates helpful for their situation in their countries, whether original or adoptive? How can marginalized writers resist discrimination and exclusion from mainstream life? The second half of this paper focuses on the belief in the transformative power of Sufism that the Turkish-German writer Zafer Şenocak shares with the mystics Yunus Emre and Jalaluddin Rumi, and the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore. For Şenocak, Sufism allows a religiosity that is not only compatible with, but also perceivable in sensuous experience. Sufism thus serves as a “third space,” a term defined by the renowned culture critic Homi Bhabha as an ambiguous, ineffable area that develops when two or more individuals/cultures interact. (shrink)

Following the publication of this article [1], it came to my attention that I unintentionally neglected to acknowledge the following sources. The transcript of the interview with the 50-year-old woman and her relatives was previously published in my book [2].

Corpus of critical study on the thought and works of Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya predominantly on philosophy of sciences with cultural philosophy; contributed articles.

Despite the salient experience of encoding threatening events, these memories are prone to distortions and often non-veridical from encoding to recall. Further, threat has been shown to preferentially disrupt the binding of event details and enhance goal-relevant information. While extensive work has characterised distinctive features of emotional memory, research has not fully explored the influence threat has on temporal memory, a process putatively supported by the binding of event details into a temporal context. Two primary competing hypotheses have been proposed; (...) that threat can impair or enhance temporal memory. We analysed two datasets to assess temporal memory for an in-person haunted house experience. In study 1, we examined the temporal structure of memory by characterising memory contiguity in free recall as a function of individual levels of heart rate as a proxy of threat. In study 2, we replicated marginal findings of threat-related increases in memory contiguity found in study 1. We extended these findings by showing threat-related increases in recency discriminations, an explicit test of temporal memory. Together, these findings demonstrate that threat enhances temporal memory regarding free recall structure and during explicit memory judgments. (shrink)

The present paper is an attempt to develop late Professor K. Satchidananda Murty’s quest to articulate Immanent and Transcendent in his philosophical journey from Upanishads to German idealism and Marxism. It is proposed to be achieved by explicating Murty’s understanding of the views of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx on human condition and its transcendence or emancipation. For this purpose, I will discuss consciousness as the ultimate reality being transcendent and immanent in Vedanta as well as in German idealism. The (...) ambition and challenge of the present article is to pursue Murty’s cross-cultural perspective to the extent that the ideas of thinkers of very different traditions, especially culturally and intellectually distinct traditions, are contested on the fullness of thought concerning immanent and transcendent as is evident in comparing Sankara, Kant, and Hegel on consciousness in relation to Buddha and Marx on suffering and alienation. Whereas Murty refers to them, from cross-cultural perspective, with limited end to substantiate his position on the “realm between” derived from Upanishads and Vedanta infused with Buddhism, I wish to present, from the same perspective, some clarifications, annotations, and summations from German idealism and Marxism, which may be useful for expanding Murty’s preliminary acquaintance with them. I wish to argue that though there is antithetical nature of these perspectives, yet the distinctions between immanent and transcendent have been one of the fundamental conceptual linkages under different cultural background. (shrink)

K. Satchidananda Murty (1924-2011) was a vociferous writer and an iconoclast. This volume is a collection of his unpublished writings It presents Murty's unpublished keynote addresses, papers presented in seminars, and lectures which show his reflections and arguments in contrast to contemporary philosophers with regard to recent developments in philosophy. The writings reveal Murty's rejection of established theories by well-known eastern and western philosophers, as well as his arguments in their support, and present a new interpretation of their contention in (...) the contemporary idiom. Murty critically evaluates the contemporary arguments of Malcolm, James Ross, Alvin Plantinga, Charles Hawthorne, Jean-Paul Sartre, Anthony Flew, E.H. Madden, and P.H. Hare. An important contribution, the book assesses K. Satchidananda Murty's contribution to philosophy during sixty-one years of his engagement with active writing and teaching. It will be of great interest to scholars, teachers, and students of Indian philosophy, Hindu philosophy, Vedāntic philosophy, Advaita Vedānta, comparative philosophy, religious studies, and South Asian studies. (shrink)

With the advent of logical positivism metaphysics has faced a challenge of sheer survival. This book brings forth, for the first time, an Indian defence of metaphysics against the onslaught of the positivist movement. The way Strawson, Davidson, Putnam and others have tried to encounter the anti-metaphysical move cannot be treated as a genuine defence of metaphysics. It is by analyzing the nature, meaning, purposeand relevance of metaphysics from Indian perspective that the contemporary Indian philosophers have explored a greater possibility (...) of defending metaphysics. For a consolidated,systematic and critical presentation of this uppermost philosophical issue, this volume contains the writings of T.R.V. Murti, K.D. Bhattacharya, Yashdeva Shalya, Y. Masih, G.C. Pandey, A.K Chatterjee, D.N. Dwivedi and other contemporary eminent Indian scholars. -/- This work is Peer Reviewed in Darshanik Traimasika, Year 54, volume IV, October- December 2009 by Prof. R.P. Pandey, Philosophy Department, Raipur University. 2. Peer Reviewed in JICPR, Volume XXVII, No. 2, April- June 2011 by Prof. Bijoy Barua, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT, Delhi. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-RealismS. R. SahaAdvaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism. By Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. Pp. xii + 274. Hardcover $75.00.Chakrabarthi Ram-Prasad deserves praise for Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism, a book on the core area of Advaita Vedānta philosophy, written in an analytical and comparative style, choosing contemporary Western philosophy as his canvas. (...) George Thibaut's translations of Vedānta commentaries were supplemented by the writings of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and others, who followed the style of history of philosophy in their works. But the brand of Western philosophy that served as the background for them was perhaps limited to Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian philosophy. Many later philosophers, notably Krish-nachandra Bhattacharya, Rashbihary Das, G. R. Malkani, T.R.V. Murti, and T.M.P. Mahadevan, followed an interpretive style in their writings on Vedānta, mostly confining themselves to systems of Indian philosophy. After India achieved independence, a new era began for analytical research in Indian philosophy, led by Daniel Ingalls, J. N. Mohanty, Bimal Krishna Matilal, and Arindam Chakrabarti, although their work is mostly confined to Nyāya, Buddhism, and Vedānta. Following their model many others in India and abroad have been doing important work mainly in the areas of Nyāya and Buddhism but rarely in Vedānta. The credit goes to Chakra-barthi Ram-Prasad to have been able to produce a full-length book on Advaita Vedānta written in a thoroughly analytical style that transcends geographical barriers in philosophy.The book contains an Introduction and four sections. In the Introduction we get an idea of the project Ram-Prasad has undertaken. By "Advaita" he means the philosophy that Ś an.kara argues for in his commentaries on various Upaniṣads and on Bādarāyaṇa's Vedāntasūtras. It is not Ram-Prasad's aim to give an exposition of this philosophy in the style of historicist-philological exegesis, but rather to give an innovative reconstruction of Advaita on the basis of the views of three philosophers of the school interpreted in the light of the views of prominent philosophers of the West, although the book is firmly anchored in the Indian tradition. A distinction is made in Advaita between soteriology and philosophy. The Upaniṣads declare that brahman is the ultimate reality. Brahman is, however, identical with ātman, and ātman is again identical with ji¯va. That there is a self cannot be denied, for one who denies is the self itself. This self is undeniable because it is reflexive in nature. Self, understood in this sense, is identical with brahman. ji¯va, which is conceived as suffering consciousness, is only a particular exemplification of this brahman-ātman. Every ji¯va is thus individuated ātman. The goal of liberation for an individual is nothing other than the attainment of the de-individuated state. Not only ji¯va but also the [End Page 264] world, according to Advaita, is ultimately brahman, although the world is independent of ji¯va and its cognitional states. The de-individuation of ji¯va and the reducibility of the world to brahman do not get ready acceptance in human consciousness. On the matter of such a realization, s´ravaṇa or teachings from the texts stand in need of aid from manana or philosophical reflection. Ram-Prasad has argued for a philosophy of Advaita that is not incompatible with its soteriological goal, although his interest in developing this philosophy is autonomous in character.Ram-Prasad calls the brand of philosophy that he develops in this book "non-realism." It holds that the object of experience is not what it appears to be. The object appears in experience as an "other" to cognition. According to realism, the object is really so and is elementary to reality. But according to anti-realism the object is not elementary and is reducible to cognition and hence is only a construct. Advaita metaphysics is neither realistic nor anti-realistic. Ram-Prasad argues for this philosophical position on the basis of his interpretation of some leading philosophers of... (shrink)

Advocates have sought to prove that underdetermination obtains because all theories have empirical equivalents. But algorithms for generating empirical equivalents simply exchange underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts, while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents will not support the desired sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, underdetermination does not depend on empirical equivalents: our warrant for current theories is equally undermined by presently unconceived alternatives as well-confirmed merely by the existing evidence, so long as this transient predicament recurs for each theory and body (...) of evidence we consider. The historical record supports the claim that this recurrent, transient underdetermination predicament is our own. (shrink)

We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...) models. The ‘defectiveness’ of such diagonal sentences necessarily cannot be classified by any of the determinateness predicates of the model. They are ‘ineffable liars’. We may consider them a response to the claim of Field that ‘the conditional can be used to show that the theory is not subject to “revenge problems”.’. (shrink)

We develop and apply a multi-dimensional conception of explanatory depth towards a comparative analysis of inflationary and bouncing paradigms in primordial cosmology. Our analysis builds on earlier work due to Azhar and Loeb (2021) that establishes initial condition fine-tuning as a dimension of explanatory depth relevant to debates in contemporary cosmology. We propose dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy as two further dimensions of depth in the context of problems with instability and trans-Planckian modes that afflict bouncing and inflationary approaches respectively. In (...) the context of the latter issue, we argue that the recently formulated trans-Planckian censorship conjecture leads to a trade-off for inflationary models between dynamical fine-tuning and autonomy. We conclude with the suggestion that explanatory preference with regard to the different dimensions of depth is best understood in terms of differing attitudes towards heuristics for future model building. (shrink)

We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

When I offered this title, I was engaging myself to investigate an apparent difference between two kinds of intentionality, in the hope that I should be able to find some firm logical criterion to distinguish them. I was less successful in this than I had hoped. I think I have gained a certain amount of insight into the logic and semantics of one kind of intentional context, largely due to the work I was doing while visiting the University of Pennsylvania (...) on Frege and on Michael Dummett’s monumental commentary on Frege. But as regards the other variety of intentionality I am still very much in the dark; so I am giving you thus far merely a progress report on that. (shrink)

We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...) is complete in Gödel’s universe of constructible sets L; (iv) give an alternative account of a theory of truth—realistic variance that simplifies full variance, whilst at the same time arriving at Kripkean fixed points. (shrink)

We analyse the extent of possible computations following Hogarth ([2004]) conducted in Malament–Hogarth (MH) spacetimes, and Etesi and Németi ([2002]) in the special subclass containing rotating Kerr black holes. Hogarth ([1994]) had shown that any arithmetic statement could be resolved in a suitable MH spacetime. Etesi and Németi ([2002]) had shown that some relations on natural numbers that are neither universal nor co-universal, can be decided in Kerr spacetimes, and had asked specifically as to the extent of computational limits there. (...) The purpose of this note is to address this question, and further show that MH spacetimes can compute far beyond the arithmetic: effectively Borel statements (so hyperarithmetic in second-order number theory, or the structure of analysis) can likewise be resolved: Theorem A. If H is any hyperarithmetic predicate on integers, then there is an MH spacetime in which any query ? n H ? can be computed. In one sense this is best possible, as there is an upper bound to computational ability in any spacetime, which is thus a universal constant of that spacetime. Theorem C. Assuming the (modest and standard) requirement that spacetime manifolds be paracompact and Hausdorff, for any spacetime there will be a countable ordinal upper bound, , on the complexity of questions in the Borel hierarchy computable in it. Introduction 1.1 History and preliminaries Hyperarithmetic Computations in MH Spacetimes 2.1 Generalising SADn regions 2.2 The complexity of questions decidable in Kerr spacetimes An Upper Bound on Computational Complexity for Each Spacetime CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

We show that Leitgeb’s dependence operator of Leitgeb is a \-operator and that this is best possible.

D. Z. Phillips is a leading figure in advocating a Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophical study of religion. His writings exert an important influence on contemporary philosophy of religion, giving a new direction to the philosophical discussion of religious belief and practice. Although his work has prompted much - often critical - comment, a thorough investigation has not been forthcoming. Grammars of Faith fills that gap. The book pays close attention to Wittgenstein's own remarks on religious belief, arranging them against (...) the background of his broader philosophical methodology, as well as to the efforts of the early Wittgensteinians at providing a more comprehensive Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion. Central to this study are Phillips's understanding of philosophical enquiry as a form of contemplation, and his descriptive accounts of religious belief. By means of a careful and methodical examination of Phillips's oeuvre, the study seeks to present a fair assessment of Phillips's position, showing not only its weaknesses, but also its strength. (shrink)

P S Wilson; Child-Centred Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–126, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1969.